On September 8, 2015, Michael B. Thompson went to a Centegra urgent care facility with complaints of pain in his back and lower abdomen, where he was given a differential diagnosis that included appendicitis. Michael underwent examination and imaging, including an abdominal CT scan. Dr. Shah reviewed the CT scan and found Michael’s appendix normal. Regarding Michael’s aorta, Shah noted “mild to moderate atherosclerotic changes” but “without definite aneurysm.”
Michael was discharged from urgent care with a diagnosis of hypertension and abdominal and back pain, and he was given medications for high blood pressure and his pain. The next day, Michael died of a ruptured aortic dissection. He was 50 years old.
Plaintiff filed her initial complaint against defendants on May 31, 2017, alleging that medical negligence caused Michael’s wrongful death, and the amended complaints continued to allege medical negligence causing wrongful death. Plaintiff alleged, in pertinent part, that all defendants were negligent in failing to diagnose Michael’s aortic dissection, which caused his death and resulted in damages to his surviving family members. A jury trial commenced on April 23, 2024.
During jury deliberations on May 2, 2024, plaintiff and the Shah defendants began talks of a high-low agreement. On May 3, 2024, while the jury continued to deliberate, plaintiff and the Shah defendants reached a high-low agreement, with a low payment of $950,000 if the Shah defendants were found not liable, and a high payment of $1.95 million if they were found liable. The agreement further provided that neither side would be allowed to appeal. The jury returned its verdict within 30 minutes of the parties entering into the high-low settlement agreement, finding Centegra liable to plaintiff but finding the Shah defendants not liable to plaintiff. The jury found the total damages suffered by Michael’s estate were $2,920,575.
On June 28, 2024, Centegra moved posttrial for, among other things, a setoff of the judgment against it. In its motion, Centegra stated that it understood that plaintiff had received a settlement of $950,000 from the Shah defendants, and it argued that the court should set off the judgment against Centegra by that amount. Its rationale was that a plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery for claimed injuries in one cause of action, and plaintiff would receive a windfall if the
trial court did not set off the judgment against Centegra by the $950,000 paid by the Shah defendants. It argued that such a double recovery was prohibited by the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (“Act) (740 ILCS 100/0.01 et seq. (West 2022).
At one point, Centegra’s counsel stated that Centegra had not brought a claim for contribution against the Shah defendants and that the two-year limitations period for bringing such a claim had expired. Counsel argued, however, that Centegra did not need to bring a claim for contribution under the Act to receive a setoff under the Act. The court denied Centegra’s request for a setoff of $950,000, explaining that Centegra had failed to show that the Act applied, as Centegra had never petitioned for contribution against the Shah defendants, thus waiving a contribution claim. Regarding section 2(c) of the Act, the court found (1) that the Shah defendants were not liable in tort and (2) that no party sought, nor did the court make, a good-faith finding.
“Setoff”
The Appellate Court of Illinois Second District stated in its January 22, 2026 Opinion: “We agree with Centegra that it did not need to file a claim for contribution to preserve its right to seek a setoff. The term “setoff” may be used in two different ways: (1) to refer to situations where a defendant has a distinct cause of action against the plaintiff suing the defendant, or (2) to refer to a defendant’s request for a reduction of the damage award because a third party, such as a
codefendant, has already compensated the plaintiff for the same injury … In the first meaning of setoff, the setoff claim must be raised in the pleadings, but in the second meaning, the setoff request may be raised at any time … When a defendant seeks a reduction in damages because a third party settled with a plaintiff, the setoff request constitutes an enforcement action rather than a counterclaim, and the setoff request is not forfeited simply because it is not raised in the pleadings … This case falls squarely into the second meaning of a setoff, permitting Centegra to raise its request for a setoff at any time, including posttrial. Accordingly, the trial court erred in concluding that Centegra forfeited its request for a setoff.”
The Illinois appellate court further stated: “Generally, high-low agreements are considered settlement agreements … More specifically, high-low agreements are a form of a covenant not to enforce judgment, in that a plaintiff promises a defendant that it will not enforce a judgment beyond the high amount in exchange for a promise by the defendant to pay at least the low amount regardless of the outcome at trial. See 740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 2022) … In the context of contribution under section 2(a) of the Act, liability in tort clearly means potential tort liability determined at the time of the plaintiff’s injury.”
“Given the existing case law and clear legislative intent, the only reasonable interpretation of section 2(c)’s phrase “liable in tort” is an interpretation consistent and harmonious with the interpretation of section 2(a)’s phrase “subject to liability in tort.” That is, both phrases refer to a defendant’s potential liability in tort determined at the time of the plaintiff’s injury. Under this interpretation of section 2(c), the Shah defendants were liable in tort, as Dr. Shah provided medical services for Michael, including examination of a CT scan of Michael’s aorta, the day before Michael’s aorta ruptured.”
“We decline plaintiff’s invitation to carve out an exception in section 2(c) for high-low agreements. High-low agreements, like the one in this case, are simply a form of a settlement agreement anticipated by the Act, which are negotiated before a verdict or finding to hedge the risks of the settling parties. We see no reason to deviate from the clear legislative intent that settlements by a joint tortfeasor may be set off from the judgment against a nonsettling tortfeasor, consistent with the principle in Illinois permitting a plaintiff only one recovery for an injury.”
“We conclude that it was not necessary for the trial court to make an explicit finding of good faith for Centegra to set off the judgment pursuant to section 2(c), because the presumption of good faith in the high-low agreement remains intact and unchallenged … the trial court erred in requiring an explicit good-faith finding for Centegra’s request for a setoff. Because we have determined that Centegra did not forfeit its claim for a setoff and that it satisfied the requirements of section 2(c) of the Act, we reverse the trial court’s denial of its request for a setoff.”
Source Thompson v. Centegra Management Services, Inc., 2026 IL App (2d) 240667.
If you or a loved one have suffered serious harm as a result of medical malpractice in Illinois or in another U.S. state, you should promptly find an Illinois medical malpractice lawyer or a medical malpractice lawyer in your state who may investigate your medical malpractice claim for you and represent you or your loved one in a medical malpractice case, if appropriate.
Click here to visit our website or call us toll-free in the United States at 800-295-3959 to find medical malpractice attorneys near you who may assist you.
Turn to us when you don’t know where to turn.
