In its January 22, 2026 Opinion, the Court of Appeals of Georgia ordered a new trial in a medical malpractice case that had resulted in a defense verdict, where the trial court erred in refusing to remove a juror for cause.
The Georgia appellate court stated: “Under these particular facts and circumstances, we conclude that the juror was disqualified and that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss him from the panel for either principal cause or for favor. MagMutual’s pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case is not in dispute. And this juror, an attorney, had MagMutual as a current client, representing its interests, through its insureds, in the precise type of litigation this case involves. The juror testified that 40 percent of his own work came from MagMutual cases and that his law firm derived “plenty” of its business from MagMutual, which reasonably led the juror to express the very practical concern that he harbored a “large potential for bias” due to negative consequences he might experience at work (and hence to his economic livelihood) should he be part of a jury that returned a verdict adverse to MagMutual. Both the “ordinary general rules of human experience” and the practicalities of the business relationship between insurance companies and the lawyers who defend the companies’ insureds teach us that it is the insurance company that hires counsel and in most instances controls the defense, and that a lawyer’s future business from the company depends on being in the continuing good graces of the insurance company. Were the juror to serve on a jury that returned a verdict adverse to MagMutual, the ordinary rules of human experience and the nature of this business relationship could very well result in MagMutual taking work away from the juror’s law firm or the juror being taken off 40 percent of his case load, making his retention or promotion at the firm less likely.”
“And we note, without belaboring, the disqualifying nature of the privileged and confidential information an attorney-juror who has the insurance company as a current client in similar litigation would in all likelihood have, including insight into, and first-hand experience with, how the insurer evaluates medical malpractice cases for purposes of settlement versus going to trial, and familiarity with the quality, credibility, and manner of preparation of experts it retains for trial. No talismanic, rehabilitative leading question on voir dire can remove that information and insight, to say nothing of the duties an insurance defense attorney may owe the insurer as part of the tripartite relationship among attorney, insured, and insurer.”
“Thus, the legal and business relationship between the juror and MagMutual was sufficiently formal, close, and subordinate to carry with it “prima facie marks of suspicion,” such that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the juror from the panel for cause.”
“We further disagree that defense counsel’s leading questions and the juror’s responses cured the disqualifying nature of the relationship between the juror and MagMutual or otherwise rehabilitated the juror’s appropriate concern about his impartiality. The attorney-juror, at best, equivocated on whether he could be impartial. We do not agree, particularly considering “the ordinary rules of human experience,” that parroting a willingness to follow an oath to be impartial is an adequate replacement for removing unqualified jurors and providing a party “a full panel of 24 competent and impartial jurors.””
The Georgia appellate court stated that it did not matter that the juror ultimately did not sit on the jury that heard the medical malpractice case, citing “longstanding precedent correctly recognizing that parties in civil cases are entitled to a full panel of 24 competent and impartial jurors and that an erroneous failure to dismiss a juror for cause is presumptively harmful, regardless of whether the objectionable juror heard the case, where the complaining party used all her peremptory strikes,” and the “longstanding rule of presumptive harm where a trial court has denied a civil litigant her statutory right to a full panel of 24 competent and impartial jurors from which to strike a jury.”
The Georgia appellate court held: “We conclude that unless and until the legislature revises OCGA § 15-12-122(b)
or our Supreme Court overrules its own cases and those of this Court holding that a trial court’s failure, in a civil case, to remove a disqualified juror from the panel constitutes reversible error, we are constrained to find that the trial court’s error here was harmful.”
Source Hoffman v. Southeastern OB/GYN Center, LLC, A25A2184.
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