In a macabre scheme spanning several years, Cedric Lodge, the person responsible for the care of cadavers at the Harvard Medical School morgue, dissected, stole, and sold parts of the bodies of individuals who donated their remains for research purposes. After the public unsealing of his Federal criminal indictment, forty-seven plaintiffs, all relatives of individuals whose remains were potentially mishandled and sold, sued the President and Fellows of Harvard College (Harvard); Mark F. Cicchetti, the managing director of the Harvard Medical School Anatomical Gift Program (AGP or program); and Tracey Fay, the manager of the AGP, for various causes of action.
In October 2023, a judge of the Superior Court consolidated the twelve cases for pretrial purposes. Thereafter, Harvard,
Cicchetti, and Fay filed a joint motion to dismiss all claims against them pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). A different Superior Court judge (motion judge) allowed the motion and dismissed all claims with prejudice, concluding that the “factual allegations in the complaints do not plausibly suggest that [the defendants] failed to act in good faith in receiving and handling the donated bodies, or that they are legally responsible for Mr. Lodge’s alleged misconduct.”
The “good faith” provision of the UAGA states, in relevant part: “A person who acts in accordance with this chapter or with the applicable anatomical gift law of another [S]tate or who attempts in good faith to do so, shall not be liable for the act in a civil action, criminal prosecution or administrative proceeding.” G. L. c. 113A, § 18 (a).
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the provision applies only to the procurement and use of an anatomical gift. Because the allegations in the complaint involve activity that took place after the remains had been put to their donative use, the plaintiffs argued that the good faith defense is not available to the defendants. The plaintiffs further argued that, even if the good faith provision does apply to conduct occurring after the procurement process, the motion judge applied an incorrect standard when evaluating whether the plaintiffs’ claims plausibly suggested the defendants failed to act in good faith. Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that the motion judge erred in holding that Lodge’s criminal conduct could not be considered in determining whether Harvard could be held liable under the act, because bad faith conduct by an employee would thereby always be outside the scope of employment.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated in its October 6, 2025 Opinion: “We conclude that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that Harvard and Cicchetti, but not Fay, failed to act in good faith as required by the UAGA. Accordingly, we hold that the allowance of the motion to dismiss was improper as to those two defendants and reverse in part.”
In response to the plaintiffs’ first argument, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated: “we note that, contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, the UAGA speaks directly to the handling of anatomical remains both before and after their use. See, e.g., G. L. c. 113A, § 14 (h) … there is nothing in the text of § 18 (a) that limits the scope of good faith immunity to the procurement process.”
Good Faith
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has defined “good faith” as “an honest belief, the absence of malice, or the absence of a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage over another … it may be possible that evidence of a peculiarly pervasive noncompliance [with the act] could warrant an inference that a defendant acted maliciously, possessed a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage over the plaintiffs, or acted out of something other than an honest belief” and thus failed to act in good faith.
“Although we focus our inquiry on Harvard’s conduct, Lodge’s misdeeds are relevant insofar as they demonstrate where Harvard failed to act in good faith in operating and overseeing the morgue. Despite the risk of harm being known to Harvard, as similar misconduct had previously occurred in a strikingly similar fashion in another medical school morgue, there were little to no controls in place to prevent this harm from occurring at Harvard … Harvard’s extraordinary failure to adequately supervise the morgue’s operations and properly protect the donated remains in its care exemplifies the kind of “peculiarly pervasive noncompliance” we have said can demonstrate a lack of good faith.”
“Harvard may, however, be held responsible for its own misconduct. It had a legal obligation to provide for the
dignified treatment and disposal of the donated human remains, and failed miserably in this regard, as Harvard itself
recognized. Harvard also had a duty to oversee Lodge’s conduct and to place proper controls over the morgue itself –- both of which it allegedly disregarded for years. In sum, these allegations amount to “peculiarly pervasive noncompliance” with the act, warranting an inference that Harvard failed to act in good faith.”
Cicchetti
“When viewing the pleadings as a whole and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiffs’ favor, we
conclude that the plaintiffs have, for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, adequately pleaded Cicchetti’s “peculiarly pervasive noncompliance” with his responsibilities under the UAGA as the AGP’s managing director. Such pleadings accordingly warrant an inference that Cicchetti did not act in good faith. The motion judge therefore erred in dismissing claims against Cicchetti on the basis of the UAGA’s good faith protection from liability.”
Fay
“In contrast, the factual allegations against Fay are insufficient to overcome her assertion of protection from liability under the UAGA. As noted supra, and as the plaintiffs correctly identified in their pleadings, Fay was the manager of
the AGP in the relevant period, not the managing director. In this position, she carried out the program’s administrative tasks and managed communications with donors and donors’ next of kin. The plaintiffs nonetheless draw conclusions as to Fay’s role and responsibilities that seem to issue from the mere fact of her title as “manager.” These speculative legal conclusions are unmoored from the facts offered by the plaintiffs regarding Fay’s role and ignore the distinct responsibilities of the manager and the managing director as set forth in the pleadings and other documents submitted by the plaintiffs in support of their claims … Fay had no supervisory responsibilities as to Lodge or, as far as factually presented in the pleadings, any compliance-related responsibilities more broadly … Given Fay’s job responsibilities and limited presence in the morgue, the allegations against her do not plausibly suggest the requisite “peculiarly pervasive noncompliance.””
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded: “We conclude that the UAGA’s good faith protection from liability is applicable to the entire anatomical donation process from procurement to disposition. We further
conclude that “peculiarly pervasive noncompliance” with the requirements of the act, including a failure to ensure the
dignified treatment and disposition of anatomical gifts, is sufficient to warrant an inference of a lack of good faith.
“Because the plaintiffs adequately pleaded “peculiarly pervasive noncompliance” against Harvard and Cicchetti, we
reverse so much of the order allowing the motion to dismiss against Harvard and Cicchetti, except as to so much of that order that dismisses the plaintiffs’ claims of respondeat superior liability against them, which we affirm. We also
affirm so much of the order allowing the motion to dismiss all claims against Fay, as the plaintiffs failed to allege facts
plausibly suggesting that Fay’s conduct constituted “peculiarly pervasive noncompliance” with her responsibilities under the act.
“We therefore affirm the order to dismiss in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Source Weiss v. President and Fellows of Harvard College (and eleven consolidated cases), SJC-13688.
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