

“Health care” is “an act or treatment performed or furnished, or that should have been performed or furnished, by a health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient’s medical care, treatment, or confinement.” The Indiana Supreme Court stated “neither Plaintiffs nor Community have alleged or shown any such connection. And without this requisite temporal tie, the underlying actions are not “health care” under the MMA.”
The Indiana Supreme Court further stated, “we conclude that Community’s internal business decisions and access protocols for medical records are not professional services provided to a patient … Community’s applicable protocols and procedures are neither conduct related “to the promotion of a patient’s health” nor do they require “the provider’s exercise of professional expertise, skill, or judgment” … Additionally relevant here, Plaintiffs were not patients of any of the orthopedic providers for whom Gray was responsible for scheduling appointments and releasing medical records. Thus, Gray’s unauthorized access of Plaintiffs’ medical records was unrelated to any professional service executed on their behalf as Community’s patients.”
The Indiana Supreme Court therefore concluded, “the alleged misconduct does not fall under the MMA. It lacks a temporal connection to any care provided by Community to the Plaintiffs as patients. And it was also unrelated to either the promotion of a patient’s health or the provider’s exercise of professional expertise, skill, or judgment.”
The Indiana Supreme Court stated, “The designated evidence raises questions of fact as to whether Gray’s unauthorized access of Plaintiffs’ medical records arose naturally or predictably from her unrestricted access to the records of all Community patients. We reach this conclusion based on a combination of factors: Community’s complete control over Gray’s access to patient records; Gray’s lack of understanding regarding the scope of that access; and Community’s failure to identify the misconduct.”
Negligence Claims
However, with regard to the negligence-based claims, the Indiana Supreme Court stated, “Plaintiffs maintain that Community is liable under two negligence theories: vicarious liability for Gray’s negligence and direct liability for negligent supervision, training, and retention. The allegations for the claims are different, but both require the same three elements: (1) duty; (2) breach; and (3) compensable damages proximately caused by the breach … Though summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases, it is appropriate when the undisputed facts negate one of the required elements. Id. And here, both negligence claims fail as a matter of law for the same reason: lack of compensable damages … the undisputed facts establish that Plaintiffs did not perceive any physical injury to a loved one. Thus, because emotional-distress damages are unavailable to Plaintiffs, both negligence claims fail. Community is therefore entitled to summary judgment on the claim for vicarious liability based on Gray’s alleged negligence and on the claim for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision.”
Public Disclosure Of Private Facts Claim
An “invasion of privacy” encompasses four distinct injuries: (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) appropriation of likeness; (3) public disclosure of private facts; and (4) false-light publicity. The third category — public disclosure of private facts — is not concerned with the accuracy of the private facts revealed, but rather “the propriety of stripping away the veil of privacy with which we cover the embarrassing, the shameful, the tabooed, truths about us.” The Indiana Supreme Court stated with regard to this cause of action, “But even if Gray divulged this information to members of her family, a communication to a small group of persons is generally not actionable. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a. And it is not actionable here because the record is devoid of evidence that Gray disclosed the information to, or in a way that was sure to reach, the public or a large number of people.”
The Indiana Supreme Court ultimately held: “We affirm the trial court’s denial of Community’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs’ claims are not subject to Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act. But we reverse the denial of Community’s motion for summary judgment because Community has affirmatively negated a required element on each of the claims against it. We thus remand to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Community on all claims.”
Source Community Health Network, Inc. v. Heather McKenzie, et al., Supreme Court Case No. 20S-CT-648.
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