Martha Espinoza tripped and fell on two overlapped floor mats while accompanying her grandson to his appointment at St. Mary Medical Center. Espinoza filed a negligence claim against the Medical Center, arguing that it was liable for her injuries. At trial, the Medical Center obtained judgment on the evidence after Espinoza failed to prove during her case-in-chief that the Medical Center had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard. Espinoza repeated her negligence claim in a motion to correct errors while also arguing that the trial judge should have recused himself because his son worked for the law firm representing the Medical Center. The trial court rejected Espinoza’s motion in full by reiterating that judgment on the evidence was merited and ruling that disqualification was unwarranted.
Indiana’s Code of Judicial Conduct instructs a judge to “disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification.” Ind. Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11 cmt. 5.
Indiana Trial Rule 79(C) governs the disqualification or recusal of a judge and provides: A judge shall disqualify and recuse whenever the judge, the judge’s spouse, a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, the spouse of such a person, or a person residing in the judge’s household:
(1) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or trustee of a party;
(2) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(3) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or
(4) is associated with the pending litigation in such fashion as to require disqualification under the Code of Judicial
Conduct or otherwise.
Similarly, Indiana Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11 regulates the disqualification of judges and provides in part:
(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances: (1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding (2) The judge knows that the judge, the judge’s spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is: (a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or trustee of a party; (b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (c) a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or (d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. (3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge’s spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the judge’s family residing in the judge’s household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding.
The fourth comment to Rule 2.11 clarifies that: [4] The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the judge is affiliated does not itself disqualify the judge. If, however, the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned under paragraph (A), or the relative is known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be substantially affected by the proceeding under paragraph (A)(2)(c), the judge’s disqualification is required.
The Court of Appeals of Indiana stated in its Memorandum Decision filed on April 1, 2024: “First, as the trial judge noted, his son had no role or connection to this case. See Jud. Cond. R. 2.11 cmt. 4 (clarifying that recusal is not required, unless mandated by another rule, where a relative of the judge is affiliated with an involved law firm). Second, the judge’s son also had no economic interest, as defined by the Judicial Code of Conduct, in this matter. See Jud. Cond. R. 2.11(A)(3); Jud. Cond. R. 2.11 cmt. 6 (“‘Economic interest,’ as set forth in the Terminology section, means ownership of more than a de minimis legal or equitable interest.”). Third, the son’s employment was a matter of public record throughout this case; signifying no attempt to conceal this fact from Espinoza. Taken together, these facts create no rational basis for an objective observer to doubt the judge’s impartiality. And to the extent that Espinoza’s argument can be read as saying that the trial judge demonstrated its bias by ruling against her, we reject it in full.”
Source Martha Espinoza v. St. Mary Medical Center, Inc., Memorandum Decision 23A-CT-1204.
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