Rodney Martin worked for B.F. Goodrich Company (“Goodrich”) from 1966 to 2012, when he retired. During his employment, Rodney was exposed to vinyl chloride monomer and products containing vinyl chloride until 1974. These chemicals are alleged to be known causes of angiosarcoma of the liver.
On December 11, 2019, Rodney was diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver, and he died on July 9, 2020. Rodney’s widow, Candice Martin, filed a civil action in November 2021 and amended her complaint on July 1, 2022. In her amended complaint, Martin asserted a cause of action under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 2022)) and the Survival Act (755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 2022)), alleging Rodney’s occupational exposure to hazardous levels of vinyl chloride monomer caused his illness and death. Martin named Goodrich as defendant, along with PolyOne, as a successor-in-interest to Goodrich. Because Martin filed a civil suit outside the compensation system provided under the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/1 et seq. (West 2022)), she invoked the exception in section 1.1 of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (id. § 1.1) to avoid its exclusivity provisions for work-related exposures to
hazardous materials.
In response, PolyOne filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, while Goodrich filed a motion to dismiss under the exclusivity provisions. Goodrich argued the exception in section 1.1 did not apply because section 1(f) was not a statute of repose and section 6(c) did not bar Martin’s claim. In the alternative, Goodrich argued that using section 1.1 to revive Martin’s claim would infringe its due process rights under the Illinois Constitution.
Section 1(f) provides: “No compensation shall be payable for or on account of any occupational disease unless disablement, as herein defined, occurs within two years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease, except in cases of occupational disease caused by berylliosis or by the inhalation of silica dust or asbestos dust and, in such cases, within 3 years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of such disease and except in the case of occupational disease caused by exposure to radiological materials or equipment, and in such case, within 25 years after the last day of last exposure to the hazards of such disease.”
The district court denied the motions. Goodrich asked the court to certify two legal questions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The district court then certified two questions for interlocutory appeal:
(1) whether section 1(f) is an applicable statute of repose for purposes of section 1.1, and (2) if so, whether applying section 1.1 to allow plaintiff’s civil case to proceed would violate Illinois’s constitutional substantive due process. The
Seventh Circuit agreed to take the appeal.
The Illinois Supreme Court was asked to weigh in on these issues. The Illinois Supreme Court stated in its January 24, 2025 Opinion: “the bar to compensation in section 1(f) does not relate to the accrual of a cause of action. The time runs whether or not the employee has discovered the injury or been diagnosed with a disease … Therefore, by its plain language, section 1(f) is a statute of repose … sections 6(c) and 1(f) should be read together to effectuate the legislative intent. Having done so, we do not find the legislature intended these sections to be read differently in terms of the application of the time requirements to employee claims. Compliance with both sections is a condition precedent to recovery, but this does not mean they are also not statutes of repose. A condition precedent is something that must be done before something else can happen. Under sections 1(f) and 6(c), before an employee can file a claim or receive
compensation, he must apply for compensation within the time period specified in section 6(c) for occupational diseases that caused disablement within the time period specified in section 1(f). Failure to satisfy either requirement extinguishes the employee’s claim and his ability to seek compensation. Therefore, both sections are conditions precedent to recovery … reading the plain language of sections 1.1, 1(f), and 6(c) together, we find that the legislative intent was to ensure that employees like the one in Folta were able to seek compensation even if they did not discover
their injury within the time limits provided under the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act.”
“A cause of action “accrues” when facts exist that authorize the bringing of a cause of action. Thus, a tort cause of action accrues when all its elements are present, i.e., duty, breach, and resulting injury or damage … This means
that any right to a defense based on the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act accrues when the employee discovers his injury. In this case, Rodney was diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver in 2019, and his
complaint was initially filed in 2021. This was after the enactment of section 1.1. Because defendants did not have a vested right in an exclusivity defense, to apply section 1.1 prospectively would allow claims such as Rodney’s to proceed without violating due process.”
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded: “First certified question: section 1(f) is a period of repose or repose provision for purposes of section 1.1. Second certified question: section 1.1 should be applied prospectively under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. Third certified question: application of section 1.1 prospectively does not offend Illinois’s due process guarantee.”
Source Martin v. Goodrich Corp., 2025 IL 130509.
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