Plaintiff Debbie Mroz sued Pain Specialists of Greater Chicago, S.C. and Dr. Scott McDaniel for professional negligence. Mroz alleged that, during a procedure to treat her back pain, Dr. McDaniel used an ineffective antiseptic, leading her to develop a serious infection that required her to be hospitalized and has a long-term impact on her quality of life. The Illinois medical malpractice jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants.

Out of the presence of the jury, Dr. McDaniel had testified that, after being sued in this case, he initially switched to using ChloraPrep as an antiseptic, which he explained as “basically practicing defensive medicine.” At some later point, he started using Betadine and ChloraPrep together based on literature stating that Betadine was more effective against MRSA.

Mroz argued on appeal that the trial judge erred by granting the defendants’ motion in limine that barred her from introducing evidence that, at some point after her RFA procedure, Dr. McDaniel and Dr. Glaser started using ChloraPrep (a brand name for chlorhexidine) as an antiseptic rather than Betadine. The trial judge found that, regardless of their reasons for using ChloraPrep, there was “a strong public policy favoring improvements to enhance public safety,” that “the prejudice to the Defendants would outweigh any probative value,” and that the jury would view the conduct as an admission of negligence. Additionally, the trial judge rejected Mroz’s contention that “ ‘subsequent remedial measure’ requires that there be some actual remedy—that the change be for a purpose that increased safety, ‘whether it’s a change in law, a change in circumstances, a change in research about safety, a change in opinions about safety.’”

The Appellate Court of Illinois First District Fourth Division held in its January 16, 2025 Order: “Even if the trial court erred by restricting plaintiffs’ cross-examination of defendants’ standard-of-care experts, plaintiffs were not prejudiced because any error did not affect the testimony of defendants’ causation expert, which, under the general-verdict rule, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict in favor of defendants … we do not need to consider whether the trial court erred. We find that plaintiffs have not shown that they were prejudiced by the alleged error.”

General Verdict Rule

The general verdict rule, also known as the two-issue rule, provides that a general verdict for the plaintiffs or the defendants without special interrogatories will not be disturbed if the case involved two or more determinative issues, or two or more theories were presented, and there was sufficient evidence to support at least one of the issues or theories that was free from prejudicial error. In other words, where multiple claims, theories, or defenses were raised, a general verdict creates a presumption that the jury found in favor of the victorious party on every claim, theory, or defense raised. Additionally, if multiple theories or defenses are raised, a party must submit special interrogatories to determine whether any error in an alleged erroneous instruction could have affected the verdict.

The Illinois appellate court stated in the case it was deciding: “the jury’s general verdict in favor of defendants could have been based on either the expert testimony that Dr. McDaniel did not breach the standard of care or Dr. Citronberg’s expert testimony that the procedure did not cause Debbie’s MRSA infection … In other words, “the jury could have found for [the physician] because it found he did not breach the duty of care, because it found that any breach by [the physician] did not proximately cause [the patient’s] death, or both” … Because plaintiffs did not submit any special interrogatories that would have revealed which of those grounds the jury relied on, the general-verdict rule requires us to presume that the jury found in defendants’ favor as to both.”

“That presumption is fatal to plaintiffs’ request for a new trial. Their claims of error on appeal all relate to the standard-of-care opinions offered by Dr. McDaniel and Dr. Glaser. While those alleged errors might have affected the jury’s determination as to whether Dr. McDaniel’s use of Betadine breached the standard of care, they did not affect the jury’s evaluation of the evidence as to causation, and Dr. Citronberg’s testimony that Debbie’s MRSA infection was not the result of the RFA procedure that had taken place four months earlier provided a sufficient, independent basis for the jury to return a verdict in favor of defendants. Under the general-verdict rule, plaintiffs cannot show that the limits the trial court placed on their ability to cross-examine Dr. McDaniel and Dr. Glaser prejudiced them, so there is no basis for overturning the jury’s verdict or the trial court’s judgment thereon.”

Source Mroz v. Hinsdale Surgical Center, LLC, 2025 IL App (1st) 240062-U.

If you or a loved one may have been injured (or worse) as a result of a surgical infection in Illinois or in another U.S. state, you should promptly find an Illinois medical malpractice lawyer, or a medical malpractice lawyer in your state, who may investigate your surgical infection medical malpractice claim for you and represent you or your loved one in surgical infection malpractice case, if appropriate.

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Illinois Appellate Court Applies General-Verdict Rule In Affirming Medical Malpractice Defense Verdict
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Illinois Appellate Court Applies General-Verdict Rule In Affirming Medical Malpractice Defense Verdict
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Plaintiff Debbie Mroz sued Pain Specialists of Greater Chicago, S.C. and Dr. Scott McDaniel for professional negligence. Mroz alleged that...
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Medical Malpractice Lawyers
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