T’Dawn Sampson, individually and as parent and next friend of her minor child, Ashton, filed a Georgia medical malpractice lawsuit alleging that The Medical Center, Inc., April Hartman, M. D., and Emily Cooley, R.N. (“defendants”) negligently failed to inform her of the dangers of co-sleeping with her newborn son. She argued that this failure to warn led to her co-sleeping with her child, which caused serious injury and permanent disability to the child. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding that “the only evidence” Sampson provided that her child’s injuries were caused by co-sleeping was the “speculative testimony from her expert witnesses.” Sampson appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by ruling that her experts’ opinion testimony was purely speculative.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia stated in its October 23, 2023 opinion: “the record shows that Ashton Crowder was born at 38 weeks of gestation via an uncomplicated vaginal delivery at Columbia Regional Health Midtown Medical Center on September 9, 2016. Ashton is the youngest of Sampson’s four children. Although the defendants recognized and documented Sampson’s knowledge deficits regarding the care of her newborn, there is evidence in the record
that they failed to comply with the hospital’s protocol to educate new parents about newborn safety, particularly warning against co-sleeping, and failed to provide Sampson with a bassinet and other baby equipment that would normally have been given to her as a Medicaid recipient.”
“Sampson brought Ashton home from the hospital on September 11, 2016. Once home, Sampson co-slept with Ashton in her king size bed, positioning the infant lying flat and moving blankets and pillows away from his body. She testified that she co-slept with Ashton because she did not have a crib or bassinet for him. Sampson noticed that Ashton often made odd grunting noises while sleeping and that he was exhibiting signs of reflux following feedings. Despite this, Sampson failed to follow her discharge instructions to attend a well-baby appointment with a pediatrician within three days of discharge from the hospital and did not otherwise see a medical provider to address the issue,”
“Sampson testified that she fell asleep next to Ashton in bed on September 17, 2016. She was later awakened by Ashton making “awkward noise[s]” signifying that he was struggling to breathe. When she picked Ashton up, he was cold, slumped over and his eyes were rolled in the back of his head. Sampson testified that she did not remember waking up and being on top of the infant and she did not believe it was possible that she had rolled over on top of him because there was “space between” their bodies in the bed. She further did not notice anything, such as a blanket or a pillow, obstructing his airway.”
At the hospital, Ashton was diagnosed with hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy (“HIE”) and other issues, including congenital laryngomalacia, anemia, acute respiratory failure with hypoxemia, coagulopathy, acute kidney failure, convulsions, seizures, hemorragic disease, intercranial hemorrhages, transitory hyperammonemia, melena, glysosuria, hepatomegaly, esophageal reflux metabolic acidosis, and acute renal insufficiency. Ashton’s physicians were unable to determine the cause of his injuries. As a result of his hypoxic-ischemic brain injury, Ashton suffers from cerebral palsy and developmental delays.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, in part, arguing that Sampson had not shown evidence indicating causation because there was no direct proof of what caused Ashton’s injuries.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia held: “In this case, the trial court applied an incorrect standard when it held that
Sampson’s experts were required to “give a definite conclusion as to what had occurred” based upon “concrete evidence.” Rather, Georgia law “requires only that an expert state an opinion regarding proximate causation in terms stronger than that of medical possibility, i. e., reasonable medical probability or reasonable medical certainty,” and such an expert must “express some basis for both the confidence for which his opinion is formed and the probability that his conclusion is accurate” … The expert can meet this requirement by “stating that the only apparent cause of the . . . injury was the defendant’s action.””
“Here, there was testimony from Sampson’s experts that they believed, with reasonable medical certainty, that Ashton’s injuries were caused by Sampson co-sleeping with him. They reached their conclusions by examining Ashton’s medical records and test results from the initial emergency room visit and resulting hospital stay at CHOA and by ruling out other causes of the oxygen deprivation that contributed to his injuries. Both experts provided testimony regarding “the basis for which [their] conclusion[s were] formed, and the probability that [they are] accurate” by proving, through ruling out other possible causes of Ashton’s injuries, that “the only apparent cause of the [infant’s] injury” was co-sleeping with his mother … This methodology for the formulation of these opinions is sufficient under Georgia law … “Absolute certainty” is not the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony, and where, as here, the qualified expert’s opinion rests upon a reliable basis, it is admissible even where the expert candidly concedes it cannot be stated with “absolute certainty.””
Source Sampson v. The Medical Center, Inc., A23A1014.
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