
The trial judge stated that while he had discretion to vacate the consent order, he was persuaded by the Defendants’ argument that the Plaintiff willingly and knowingly entered into this agreement to dismiss these claims “with prejudice” seventeen months earlier. The Plaintiff obtained the benefit of avoiding potentially significant motion practice and agreed to provide finality to the Defendants as to these claims. The length of the delay and the benefit derived as a result of the agreement “convince this Court that it is proper to allow the order to remain in place.”
At Parrish’s request, the trial court certified its order for immediate review and Parrish filed an application for interlocutory review, which the Georgia Appellate Court granted.
Parrish contended in his appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate the consent order because the court: (1) failed to conduct a substantive analysis or weigh the relative benefit and harm to the parties; (2) erroneously interpreted its duty to protect the interests of a minor child; (3) failed to consider that there is a legitimate basis for vacating the order, as the statute of limitation for S. P.’s claims has not expired; and (4) wrongly declined to exercise its equitable powers, given the compelling and unique facts of this case.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the trial court and held in its June 9, 2022 opinion: “there is no dispute that S. P., as the sole surviving child of Ruggles (who was unmarried at the time of her death), had standing to bring a wrongful death claim on behalf of her mother. However, she voluntarily relinquished those claims by entering into the consent order. Assuming, without deciding, that S. P.’s prior counsel entered into the consent order — agreeing to dismiss her wrongful death claims against Marshall and Finn — based on his mistaken belief that the statute of limitation had run on these claims, Parrish fails to provide any support for his argument that the trial court should have exercised its equitable powers to vacate the consent order. See OCGA § 23-2-27 (“Mere ignorance of the law on the part of the party himself, where the facts are all known and there is no misplaced confidence and no artifice, deception, or fraudulent practice is used by the other party either to induce the mistake of law or to prevent its correction, shall not authorize the intervention of equity.”). Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Parrish’s motion to vacate the consent order.”
Parrish v, St. Joseph’s/Candler Health System, Inc., A22A0484.
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