Texas Supreme Court Applies One-Satisfaction Rule In Reducing Medical Malpractice Verdict

Court Applies One-Satisfaction Rule In Reducing Verdict: The Supreme Court of Texas stated in its opinion dated February 17, 2023: “This medical malpractice case presents two principal questions about how to calculate the trial court’s judgment: (1) whether to credit a settlement by a family member under Chapter 33 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code; and (2) whether to order periodic payments of damages for future medical expenses under Chapter 74—the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA).”

“The case involves a woman who suffered brain injuries due to complications from gastric-bypass surgery; she and her minor daughter sued several defendants. After the daughter settled her claims for loss of services and loss of consortium against one defendant, the woman nonsuited her claims against that defendant. A jury later awarded the woman over $14 million against other defendants. These defendants sought to apply the daughter’s settlement against the award and to pay the future damages in periodic payments. The trial court rejected these requests, and the court of appeals largely affirmed the judgment.”

“We hold that Chapter 33 required a credit for the daughter’s settlement because her claims were for her mother’s injury and that this result does not violate the Open Courts provision of the Texas Constitution. Further, on this record, the TMLA required the trial court to order that at least some of the future damages be paid periodically. We reverse the judgment in part and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings to form a proper judgment on these issues of damages.”

The Underlying Facts

Jo Ann Puente suffered brain injuries due to complications from gastric-bypass surgery. Puente and her daughter sued various defendants for medical malpractice. With regard to defendant Dr. Jesus Virlar, the plaintiffs alleged that he failed to order thiamine supplements, which Jo Ann Puente’s expert witness testified led her to develop Wernicke’s disease, a brain dysfunction associated with thiamine deficiency. Without the supplements, the disease progressed to a more debilitating brain disorder, Korsakoff’s syndrome. Puente died while the appeal was pending.

Puente settled with one defendant and his associated defendants for $200,000 and nonsuited her claims against some parties with whom her minor daughter and Puente’s mother had settled. The only claims tried were Puente’s claims against Dr. Virlar, Dr. Virlar’s employer, GMG Health Systems Associates, P.A. (“Gonzaba”), and Dr. Martinez. The jury found Drs. Virlar and Patel negligent, and it found Dr. Virlar 60% responsible and Dr. Patel 40% responsible for Puente’s
injuries; it failed to find Dr. Martinez negligent. The jury awarded Puente $133,202 for past earnings lost, $888,420 for future earning capacity lost, and $13,262,874.86 for future medical expenses.

Chapter 33 reduces the damages a claimant may recover by “the sum of the dollar amount of all settlements.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.012(c). The statute includes in the definition of claimant “any person who is seeking . . . recovery of damages for the injury . . . of [another] person.” § 33.011(1)(B). Chapter 33 is based on the one-satisfaction
rule.

The Supreme Court of Texas stated: “The plain text of the statute, and our precedents interpreting it, confirm that Chapter 33 credits go beyond the one-satisfaction rule’s common-law contours. In a health care liability claim like this,
Chapter 33 requires that the court “reduce the amount of damages to be recovered by the claimant” by an amount based on one of two methods elected by the defendant. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.012(c). The defendant can choose a dollar-for-dollar credit for all settlements or a percentage credit equal to each settling person’s percentage of
responsibility. Here, Gonzaba chose the dollar-for-dollar credit.”

The Supreme Court of Texas held: “C.P.’s [the minor’s] claims are for injury to her mother, Puente. C.P. sought damages for her loss of Puente’s services and consortium, which resulted from the brain injuries to Puente. Thus, the claimant
here is C.P. as well as Puente, and Chapter 33 requires that the total damages awarded to Puente be reduced by the dollar amount of C.P.’s settlement with Metropolitan Methodist Hospital: $3.3 million … Puente’s recovery under Chapter 33 after crediting Metropolitan Methodist’s settlement with C.P. would be approximately $10.8 million.” [C.P. had non-suited her claims against Metropolitan Methodist Hospital after it settled with C.P.]

“Under the percentage-contribution rule, therefore, Puente would be able to recover only 60% of the damages awarded—about $8.5 million—from Gonzaba and Dr. Virlar. Because the application of Chapter 33 gives Puente a greater recovery than she would have obtained under the common law, she has not lost a common-law remedy. Thus, we need not address in this case whether or to what extent a reduction in an award of common-law damages due to statutory settlement credits would amount to withdrawal of a common-law remedy … Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment in part and hold that applying Chapter 33 to require a credit for C.P.’s settlement does not violate the Open Courts provision. On remand, the trial court should credit C.P.’s settlement against Puente’s recovery in forming its judgment.”

Periodic Payments Of Future Medical Expenses

The Supreme Court of Texas further held: “Because the record shows that the trial court could reasonably craft a payment plan, it was required to do so. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.503(a). The trial court’s failure to award any periodic payments was error, and we reverse the portion of the judgment awarding all of the damages for future medical expenses in a lump sum. Given that Puente died during the pendency of this appeal, the trial court should determine on remand how much of the award of future medical expenses she should have received in a lump sum and how much she was projected to incur periodically between the time of trial and her death. Puente’s estate is entitled to recover those amounts. Subchapter K provides that periodic payments of future medical expenses “terminate on the death of the recipient,” id. § 74.506(b), so the court should not order petitioners to pay damages for any future medical expenses Puente was projected to incur after the date of her death.”

Source Jesus Virlar, M.D. v. Jo Ann Puente, No. 20-0923.

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